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Where There Is a Right, There Must Be a Remedy 
(Even in Medicaid)
Nicole Huberfeld1
“The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men.It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right.”2
Introduction
The Medicaid Act invites a power struggle in its opening language, which states: “[T]here is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year 
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made 
available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which 
have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical 
assistance.”3 Like the Spending Clause in which it is rooted,4 this language is 
deceptively straightforward, because it creates the potential for a permanent 
relationship between the federal executive branch, states, and the individual 
providers and beneficiaries benefited by Medicaid, but it addresses only the 
beginning of Medicaid’s programmatic operations. The question of what 
should happen if a state does not adhere to its own “plan for medical assistance” 
is not addressed by the Medicaid Act, other than to permit the Secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to withdraw funding,5 but 
this is deemed a nuclear option because of the harm that withdrawal of funds 
would do to program enrollees.
The power struggle invited by the Medicaid Act will be magnified by 
the substantial Medicaid expansion facilitated by the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA).6 Medicaid is generally treated as either an 
afterthought or a political football.7 This afterthought will add millions of new 
1 H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law and Bioethics Associate, University of Kentucky. Many 
thanks to my co–panelists and the participants in the Health Law Professors Conference and the 
Medicaid Matters workshop. Thanks to Christopher Held for diligent, persistent research assis-
tance. Thanks always DT. Comments are welcome: nicole.huberfeld@uky.edu.
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1396–1 (2012).
4 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
6 Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 431, 432 (2011).
7 See Robert Stevens & Rosemary Stevens, Welfare Medicine in America 51 (1974) 
(“Compared with Medicare, which had cut–and–dried provisions for eligibility and benefits, Med-
icaid . . . was relatively ill–designed, its future vague.”); Laura Katz Olson, The Politics of 
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enrollees by the ACA’s expansion of eligibility as of January 1, 2014.8 The states 
that are expanding their Medicaid enrollment are concerned about the future 
costs of the newly enrolled population, despite the federal government funding 
the expansion completely for the first several years of its implementation. One 
method by which Medicaid costs can be controlled without federal oversight 
is by decreasing payment to healthcare providers who care for Medicaid 
beneficiaries.9 But, providers will face an influx of new enrollees with only a 
short–lived federal increase in their payment rates, leading to the possibility 
that providers will seek to enjoin states from cutting payment rates in a wave of 
litigation potentially unparalleled in Medicaid’s history. 
This anticipated growth of Medicaid under the ACA and the litigation that 
may follow it highlights the quagmire surrounding private enforcement of the 
Medicaid Act, which the states have been trying to quash for decades.10 The 
Medicaid Act does not provide a private right of action except when a person 
who is eligible for Medicaid is denied entry into the program.11 Nevertheless, 
historically, both Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have been able to protect 
their rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows individuals to seek redress 
against states in federal court for violations of statutory or constitutional rights, 
or through the Supremacy Clause, which prevents states from enacting laws that 
violate superseding federal laws.12 These actions both shield the individuals who 
seek federal court protection and flag state noncompliance for the understaffed 
HHS, but such litigation is imperiled by aggressive state sovereignty arguments 
and by a conservatively leaning Supreme Court. 
States have argued that no private right of action is available to Medicaid 
providers or beneficiaries because the Medicaid Act itself does not create a 
private enforcement mechanism. They reason that anything other than federal 
agency negotiation and enforcement does not meet the Court’s standard 
for clear notice of conditions on federal spending programs and is a state 
sovereignty violation.13 In other words, states have claimed that federalism 
Medicaid 10–11 (2010) (describing Medicaid as a typically “low profile” issue until politicians fight 
about it).
8 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. 
119, 271–79 (2010) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 2011)).
9 See Olson, supra note 7, at 59 (noting that states commonly limit Medicaid expenses by 
targeting provider reimbursement); see also Memorandum from Kathleen S. Swendiman, Legisla-
tive Att’y, & Evelyne B. Baumrucker, Analyst in Health Care Financing, Cong. Research Serv., 
Selected Issues Related to the Effect of NFIB v. Sebelius on the Medicaid Expansion Requirements 
in Section 2001 of the Affordable Care Act 5–6 ( July 16, 2012) (on file with author) (noting that 
the ACA’s maintenance of effort, MOE, provision does not prevent a state from “reducing provider 
reimbursement rates or from limiting optional benefits”).
10 See infra Parts I.B, I.C and accompanying text.
11 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.151–154, 431.200–245 (2012) (administrative 
process for simple claim denial); 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 (2012) (denial of eligibility for enrollment).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
13 These concepts are rooted in the early Rehnquist–era conditional spending case, Pennhurst 
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protects them from being hailed into federal court by Medicaid providers or 
beneficiaries because they are answerable only to the Secretary.14 Some federal 
courts have agreed with this analysis, though many have not, and no Supreme 
Court holding has directly prevented private litigants from addressing state 
failures in the Medicaid program.15 The question is which story the Supreme 
Court will believe the next time a state successfully petitions for certiorari.
This Article will explore the power struggle that Medicaid invites and its 
potential elevation due to the pressures that will follow the ACA’s expansion. 
Part I of this Article will describe the three phases of private enforcement 
litigation and how they have affected Medicaid reimbursement rates. This Part 
also will highlight the deceptive stability that has taken root in the lower federal 
courts by describing the recent state attempts to end private enforcement actions. 
The first Part will conclude by briefly considering the nature of the federalism 
arguments that states are making. Part II will explain why lawmakers missed an 
important opportunity to add an explicit right of action to the Medicaid Act 
when drafting the ACA, while at the same time they created a law that will 
increase the need for federal oversight. The second Part will then explore how 
the ACA contributes to the Medicaid power struggle. The Article concludes 
that private actions in federal court provide indispensable balance as well as 
a much needed de facto oversight mechanism for the already overextended, 
underfunded HHS.
I. Cooperative Federalism and Medicaid Enforcement
Medicaid is a federal program that provides matching funds to states that 
agree to abide by the requirements of the Medicaid Act.16 The Medicaid Act 
creates a foundation for the program, requiring participating states to ensure 
that Medicaid beneficiaries receive care that is equal to the access of other 
patients in their geographic region, setting forth mandatory elements of the 
Medicaid program, and allowing states to choose additional coverage through 
optional elements of the program.17 States that agree to participate in Medicaid 
(they all have done so for decades now) must submit a State Plan to HHS 
describing how the state will comply with the Medicaid Act and which options 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
14 And yet, states claim the protection of federal courts when they believe they are being 
“coerced” by the federal government in the Medicaid program. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012) (holding that states cannot be required by the ACA to partici-
pate in the Medicaid expansion because it unconstitutionally coerces them); see also Planned Par-
enthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 973 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(describing the spending power analysis in NFIB as protecting states from agreeing to conditions 
they could not know exist in the context of private rights of action to enforce the Medicaid Act).
15 See infra Parts 1.A.3, I.B and accompanying text.
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w (2012).
17 This is sometimes called “equal access” or the “30(A)” requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)
(A) (2012).
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it chooses to provide to its impoverished citizens. Any changes to the State Plan 
must be submitted as a State Plan Amendment, called an SPA, and SPAs are 
also submitted when the Medicaid Act is modified.18 Additionally, states can 
apply for “waivers” from HHS, which allow states to create their own Medicaid 
programs by violating, with HHS permission, elements of the Medicaid Act.19
People who qualify for Medicaid have an enforceable right to the medical 
assistance that states must provide through the program.20 However, if the state 
modifies its Medicaid program, there is very little beneficiaries or healthcare 
providers can do aside from seek redress in federal court, as the Medicaid Act 
does not provide specific enforcement mechanisms.21
The interaction between the states and the federal government in Medicaid 
is a living, breathing, cooperative federalism saga. This section will explore one 
aspect of that story by studying mechanisms by which states are reined in when 
they run afoul of the Medicaid Act.
A. Three Phases of Private Enforcement
Medicaid–related litigation can be thought of in three phases, each of 
which is keyed to a Supreme Court decision regarding § 1983 causes of action, 
and each of which roughly corresponds to the status of a statutory element 
of the Medicaid Act called the Boren Amendment.22 Each phase also closely 
tracks the Court’s interpretation of the enforceability of federalism principles. 
First is the Maine v. Thiboutot23 phase, in which the Court explicitly opened 
the courthouse doors to enforcing Medicaid statutory rights through § 1983 
in the pivotal Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association decision.24 The second is 
the Blessing v. Freestone25 phase, in which the Court began to limit all such 
private rights of action by delineating a three–part test that explained when 
private parties could pursue statutory rights under § 1983. Third is the Gonzaga 
University v. Doe26 phase, in which the Court seemingly limited the Blessing
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.10–.12 (2012) (covering the State Plan and 
State Plan Amendment).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 430.25 (covering waivers to State Plan Amend-
ments).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2012) (“A State plan for medical assistance must . . . provide—for 
making medical assistance available, including at least the care and services listed . . . to—all indi-
viduals . . . ” who meet the categorical and financial eligibility requirements of the Medicaid Act).
21 See Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid 
Entitlements, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 413, 418–27 (2008) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Tri-
angle] (describing the Medicaid program more fully).
22 The Boren Amendment was repealed in 1997. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (2012).
23 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
24 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
25 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
26 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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 test, but which shows that lower federal courts have struggled to determine 
Gonzaga’s proper application.27
1. Thiboutot and the Implementation of the Boren Amendment: Phase One.—The
first phase of Medicaid litigation followed the Court’s declaration that federal 
statutes can be enforced through § 1983 in Maine v. Thiboutot.28 Section 1983 
is one of America’s oldest federal laws, dating to the Reconstruction Era and 
designed to protect people from state violations of federal protections.29 Prior 
decisions supported the theory that § 1983 is available to provide a remedy for 
all state violations of federally–protected rights, but Thiboutot was the first clear 
articulation of the principle that the phrase “and laws” in § 1983 means that any 
federal law can be subject to § 1983 litigation, not just civil rights laws.30 Section 
1983 claims, as applicable here, allow the intended beneficiaries of federal 
statutes to bring claims in federal court when there has been a deprivation 
of the “rights, privileges, and immunities” provided by the statute. The dissent 
expressed concern that state sovereignty was infringed by the Court’s decision 
to allow private enforcement of all laws rather than just laws enforcing equal 
protection principles.31 Nevertheless, many litigants have sought protection in 
federal court from state inaction or outright violation of federal laws, especially 
federal conditional spending laws, in the wake of Thiboutot. The Court refined 
Thiboutot nine years later, holding that a violation of federal law is not enough 
for a § 1983 cause of action to exist; rather, the litigant must have a “federal 
right” that is violated, meaning that the “provision in question [must be] 
‘intend[ed] to benefit’ the putative plaintiff.”32
One law that was oft litigated during this first phase was the “Boren 
Amendment,” which was enacted in the same year that Thiboutot was decided.33
At states’ urging, the Boren Amendment was written to give states flexibility in 
determining how much and by what method they would reimburse institutional 
27 But see Edward Alan Miller, Federal Oversight, State Policy Making, and the Courts: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Nursing Facility Litigation Under the Boren Amendment, 3 J. Empirical Legal 
Stud. 145 (2006) (tracking and analyzing three phases of Medicaid litigation specific to the Boren 
Amendment’s promise of sufficient pay for nursing homes).
28 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4 (holding that the plain language of § 1983, “and laws,” indicated 
Congress’s intent to allow private rights of action against states that violate federal statutes and 
thus that welfare recipients could sue a state for retroactive benefits because the enabling statute 
created a right to the benefits).
29 Id. at 4–5. The popular title of the law is the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See id. at 15.
30 Id. at 4–8.
31 Id. at 11–12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32 Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (quoting Wright v. 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431–432 (1987)).
33 See Miller, supra note 27, at 152 (describing three phases of Boren Amendment litigation). 
Professor Miller did not describe Thiboutot as the starting point for Boren litigation, but it happens 
that Boren was passed in the same year the Court decided Thiboutot.
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healthcare providers for their services to Medicaid enrollees.34 The Boren 
Amendment allowed states to pay hospitals and nursing homes in manners 
alternative to the traditional cost–reimbursement system that had been in place 
for both Medicaid and Medicare.35 The Boren Amendment contained language 
designed to give states free rein but that required states to ensure that their 
payments were “reasonable and adequate” to meet the expenses of “efficiently 
and economically operated facilities.”36 HHS had no authority to second–guess 
states’ payment methods unless states did not submit assurances or if those 
assurances of adequate payment were patently false on their face.37
It soon became clear that states were not effectuating the “reasonable and 
adequate” requirement in any meaningful manner, as most states reduced 
payment rates to suit state budgets and stopped paying provider costs in the 
wake of Boren.38 Thus, Medicaid advocates, including enrollees, institutional 
providers, physicians, and attendant professional associations, began to sue 
under § 1983 to compel states to pay “reasonable and adequate” amounts to 
Medicaid providers.39 Although the federal executive branch had lost authority 
over state payment methods, the federal judiciary was about to gain that 
oversight.40
The pivotal case in the so–called Boren litigation was Wilder v. Virginia 
Hospital Association, in which the Court held that § 1983 could be used to 
initiate private rights of action against states that failed to adhere to the terms of 
the Medicaid Act.41 Chief Justice Rehnquist disputed the availability of § 1983 
rights of action for Medicaid providers, but the majority dismissed both the 
dissent’s and Virginia’s concerns about private rights of action.42 The majority 
found persuasive not only the language of the Boren Amendment itself, which 
specified that states “must” provide for payment at rates that were reasonable 
34 David G. Smith & Judith D. Moore, Medicaid Politics and Policy 1965–2007, at 
129 (2008).
35 Though typically called the “Boren Amendment,” 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(A) was itself 
amended numerous times to expand the institutional providers covered by its terms. See Pub. L. 
96–499, § 962(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 & Supp. V); see also Miller, supra note 27, at 
147 (reviewing the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1981, 1987, and 1990 that modified the 
Boren Amendment). This list of institutional providers also included intermediate care facilities for 
mentally retarded (ICFMR) enrollees. The National Governors’ Association was pivotal in the pas-
sage of the Boren Amendment. See Malcolm J. Harkins III, Be Careful What You Ask for: The Repeal 
of the Boren Amendment and Continuing Federal Responsibility to Ensure that State Medicaid Programs 
Pay for Cost Effective Quality Nursing Facility Care, 4 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 159, 159–60 (2001).
36 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502–03, citing 42 U.S.C §1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 
ed., Supp. V).
37 See Harkins, supra note 35, at 169–71 (describing the flexibility and lack of oversight in-
tended to be presented by the Boren Amendment).
38 Olson, supra note 7, at 60.
39 See Harkins, supra note 35, at 181–85.
40 See Harkins, supra note 35, at 179.
41 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 524.
42 Id. at 525 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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and adequate to meet costs, but also the legislative history of prior amendments 
to the Medicaid Act that indicated Congress knew of and expected private 
rights of action against those states that ran afoul of the program’s boundaries.43
In other words, the Court held that Boren gave healthcare providers a statutory 
right to reasonable reimbursement rates that they could enforce through § 1983 
litigation. Quite simply, Wilder pushed open the courthouse doors to Medicaid 
litigation against the states.44
Medicaid litigation existed before Wilder, and Congress knew of such 
litigation,45 but Wilder was a game–changer for Boren litigants. In the years 
immediately following Wilder, Boren litigants became much more successful 
having federal courts instruct states to pay “adequate” reimbursement to 
Medicaid providers.46 The successes were multiple. Providers and beneficiaries 
were more successful being heard, as a procedural matter, when they sought 
adequate payments under Boren because Wilder followed the Thiboutot
precedent of allowing statutory enforcement through § 1983.47 They were also 
more successful, substantively, by persuading federal courts that the Boren 
Amendment was enforceable against states, leading federal courts to review state 
processes in setting rates as well as leading courts to increase reimbursement 
rates.48 Ultimately, this litigation was so successful that states increased payment 
rates to healthcare providers when Boren litigation was threatened.49
In addition to opening federal courts to Medicaid litigation, Wilder
demonstrated the resistance that has become a constant sub–theme in § 1983 
claims, which has come from at least two directions: states and conservatively 
leaning jurists.50 First, states have argued that § 1983 should not afford 
healthcare providers or enrollees private causes of action against the states 
43 Id. at 517–18 (relaying comments from the Congressional Record that described Congress’s 
intent to facilitate, not end, private parties seeking injunctive relief against states that did not com-
ply with the Medicaid Act).
44 It certainly pushed the doors open to Boren litigation. See Miller, supra note 27, at 167–68 
(summarizing the phases of Boren litigation and concluding from empirical data that the post–
Wilder period resulted in the most federal judicial intervention between states and Medicaid pro-
viders).
45 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 516 (“[P]rior to the passage of the Boren Amendment, Congress in-
tended that health care providers be able to sue in federal court for injunctive relief to ensure that 
they were reimbursed according to reasonable rates. During the 1970’s, provider suits in the federal 
courts were commonplace.”).
46 See Olson, supra note 7, at 60–61 (noting the drastic increase in Boren litigation).
47 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 (relying squarely on Thiboutot).
48 See generally Harkins, supra note 35, at 159.
49 See Olson, supra note 7, at 61 (“Even the mere threat of a Boren amendment lawsuit in-
timidated elected officials, fostering increased compensation in a number of cases.”)
50 See William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 
531, 554–55 (2013) (reviewing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
pretation of Legal Texts (2012)) (describing the misplaced reliance on federalism as a statutory 
construction canon due to its inherently normative nature and the extensive reach of the federal-
ism–based mode of interpretation).
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for violations of the Medicaid Act. The states have contended that only the 
Secretary of HHS should enforce the Medicaid Act.51 Notably, the Secretary 
has never withheld all of a state’s Medicaid funds, no matter how far the state 
has diverged from the Medicaid Act, but federal courts have forced states to pay 
higher reimbursement rates through § 1983 litigation.52 And, under the Boren 
Amendment and its replacement provision, states were given the opportunity 
to prove their ability to set Medicaid payment rates, but they consistently were 
found lacking in their methodologies and payment rates.53
Second, certain jurists have, since Wilder (and Thiboutot before it), objected 
to § 1983 rights of action against states in conditional spending programs.54
This objection appears to derive from at least three ideas. First, the dissents 
expressed trepidation about states being hailed into federal court, naming state 
sovereignty concerns.55 Second, the justices have articulated concerns about 
clear notice rules, meaning they expect Congress to describe all aspects of the 
legislation it passes, leaving nothing to the imagination, especially when states 
are asked to adhere to that legislation.56 Underlying the clear notice rule is a 
strong state sovereignty norm, one that deems states to be winners by default 
when the federal government does not explicitly write its own rules. Third is 
what I call “spending power exceptionalism,” a jurisprudential judgment that 
considers the spending power to be a lesser enumerated power for Congress.57
These objections have emerged repeatedly in the three phases of private 
Medicaid litigation.
2. Blessing and the Repeal of Boren: Phase Two.—The second phase of litigating 
Medicaid grievances through § 1983 narrowed the path to the courthouse for 
Medicaid plaintiffs. This period began with Blessing v. Freestone58 and arguably 
51 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508–09 (“Petitioners argue first that the Boren Amendment does not 
create any ‘enforceable rights’ . . .”).
52 See generally Miller, supra note 27, at 156, 159–60.
53 Id.
54 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 525–26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
55 See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (expressing 
concerns about state sovereignty with the expansion of § 1983 actions against state and local actors). 
56 See Eskridge, supra note 50, at 554.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Justice Kennedy wrote:
It should be remembered, moreover, that the spending power is not designated as such 
in the Constitution but rather is implied from the power to lay and collect taxes and 
other specified exactions in order, among other purposes, “to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” The limits upon 
the spending power have not been much discussed, but if the relevant standard is paral-
lel to the Commerce Clause cases, then the limits and the analytic approach in those 
precedents should be respected.
Id. (citations omitted).
58 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
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ended, or at least merged, with Gonzaga just five years later.59 Justice O’Connor’s 
majority opinion in Blessing articulated a three–part test for determining 
whether a federal statute could be enforced through § 1983.60 This limiting 
three–part test created a “rebuttable presumption” for § 1983 rights of action, 
meaning that Congress can prevent § 1983 actions by specifying the statutory 
remedy it intends or by specifically foreclosing resort to § 1983.61 The Blessing
majority explicitly declined to overrule Thiboutot or to protect states from § 
1983 by the Eleventh Amendment, both of which were strategies employed 
by Arizona to protect itself from welfare plaintiffs.62 Nevertheless, Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy issued a concurrence questioning all § 1983 actions for all 
spending statutes.63 The concurrence called the individual plaintiffs “third party 
beneficiaries” who would not have been able to seek relief at the time § 1983 
was written under the law of contracts as it existed in 1871.64 This third party 
beneficiary analysis has arisen repeatedly as states have been sued by Medicaid 
providers and enrollees. 
Congress repealed the Boren Amendment in 1997, the same year that 
Blessing was decided.65 States found that federal courts interpreted the 
language of the amendment to require a certain level of care in establishing 
reimbursement rates. Though the states had lobbied Congress successfully to 
limit federal executive oversight of their reimbursement methods and rates in 
the creation of the Boren Amendment, they did not predict that the federal 
judiciary would step into the power vacuum that Boren was intended to create.66
In addition, lawsuits that occurred during the first phase of § 1983 litigation 
resulted in noticeably increased Medicaid costs67 because lower federal courts 
often found state rate setting to be arbitrary and the rates themselves to be too 
low.68 Consequently, the states successfully lobbied Congress to repeal the very 
59 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
60 Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41 (citations omitted). The Blessing test provided: 
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. 
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute 
is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. 
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In 
other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in manda-
tory, rather than precatory, terms.
Id. (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 341 (“Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, 
there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.”).
62 Id. at 340.
63 Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 349–50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65 See Olson, supra note 7, at 66. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 not only repealed the 
Boren Amendment, it also ushered in the widespread use of managed care in Medicaid. See id.
66 See Harkins, supra note 35, at 183–87.
67 See Teresa A. Coughlin, Leighton Ku & John Holahan, Medicaid Since 1980, at 
105 (1994).
68 See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 885 F. 2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989) (invalidating Penn-
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amendment they had requested a decade and a half earlier.69
The states wielded significant bargaining power in this situation. In 
both the creation and the destruction of the Boren Amendment, the states 
drove Medicaid policy making. When they were unsuccessful asserting their 
sovereignty in federal courts, they turned to the legislative branch and received 
the respite they sought. But Medicaid litigation did not end, because states 
tend to make economic decisions about the medical assistance promised by 
Medicaid, and those cost–cutting decisions often do not deliver on Medicaid’s 
promises.
3. Gonzaga and Post–Boren Medicaid: Phase Three.—Soon after Blessing, the 
Court held in Gonzaga University v. Doe that a statute must confer personal 
rights for a plaintiff to successfully enforce that law by § 1983, ushering in the 
third phase of § 1983 litigation.70 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion 
stressed that very few Supreme Court decisions had recognized the ability to 
pursue § 1983 actions in spending programs.71 In fact, the Chief Justice named 
only two such cases, one of which was Wilder.72 The Court did not specify how 
Gonzaga modified Blessing; rather, it summarized prior precedent and indicated 
the primacy of determining whether Congress intended to confer a private 
right of action.73 The Court’s positive reliance on Wilder indicated that Wilder
was still good law.74 But, Wilder addressed only one provision of the Medicaid 
Act out of many possible statutory sections that litigants have sought to enforce.
In this modern era of § 1983 litigation, lower federal courts have attempted 
to determine how Gonzaga limited Blessing given that the Court was not specific 
about its modification of the Blessing test.75 More specifically, the question after 
both Blessing and Gonzaga was how the Medicaid Act’s various requirements, 
some of which promise individual benefits to Medicaid enrollees, would fit 
into this more restrictive § 1983 regime. The circuits have applied § 1983 to 
Medicaid’s many provisions with some consistency, though this stability has 
sylvania’s plan for reimbursing out of state hospitals at half the rate of in state hospitals for no 
legitimate reason).
69 Joshua M. Wiener & David G. Stevenson, Repeal of the “Boren Amendment”: Implications for 
Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, Urban Institute (1998) (the Boren Amendment was repealed 
at least in part because states found it too costly), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf30.pdf.
70 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 286 (2002) (“[Our] inquiries simply require a determi-
nation as to whether or not Congress intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficia-
ries. . . . [W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to 
create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit . . . .”).
71 Id. at 281.
72 Id. at 280 (“Since Pennhurst, only twice have we found spending legislation to give rise to 
enforceable rights.”).
73 Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 434.
74 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280–81.
75 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 442–53 (discussing the circuits’ vari-
ous applications of Gonzaga to Blessing).
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taken approximately the last decade to develop.76
Generally speaking, lower federal courts’ approach to Medicaid enforcement 
actions can be characterized as permissive, with the exception of litigation 
designed to enforce Boren’s successor, called the “equal access,” “sufficiency,” or 
“30(A)” provision.77 This law requires states to pay “sufficient” rates to ensure 
equal access to medical services for the geographic location.78 After Gonzaga
was decided, lower federal courts faced with § 1983 actions to enforce 30(A) 
consistently held that the Boren Amendment’s repeal, and the more vague 
language of equal access and payment sufficiency that replaced it, indicated 
Congress’s intent to end private rights of action for reimbursement adequacy.79
But, none of these decisions have held that § 1983 actions were completely 
unavailable for Medicaid enrollees;80 though some have held that providers are 
barred from enforcing the Medicaid Act.81 The provider bar has not stopped 
providers from seeking redress, however, as they have either worked with 
enrollees as plaintiffs or have sought to enforce the Medicaid Act by Supremacy 
Clause actions.82
In asserting a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Medicaid plaintiffs claim 
that a state law contradicts the Medicaid Act and thus is invalid.83 Often, when 
raised by private parties, the Supremacy Clause is an affirmative defense to a 
state prosecution.84 In the Medicaid context, however, plaintiffs have used the 
Supremacy Clause to bring an action for injunctive relief when a state allegedly 
is violating the Medicaid Act. To be clear, this is private enforcement of a 
constitutional principle—that federal law preempts contradictory state law, but 
instead of the federal government pursuing the action, a private party is doing 
so. States have argued that only the federal government may so engage the 
76 See generally Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21 (detailing the circuit splits that 
existed due to Gonzaga’s influence on the application of the Blessing test).
77 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2012).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2012).
79 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 447–48.
80 One notable exception, Westside Mothers v. Haveman, was overruled by the Sixth Circuit 
on appeal. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich 2001) (holding that no 
§ 1983 cause of action is available to Medicaid enrollees because spending programs are nothing 
more than contracts).
81 See, e.g., Long Term Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57–59 (1st Cir. 2004) (re-
versing its pre–Gonzaga position that healthcare providers could enforce 30(A)).
82 See, e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) 
(avoiding the question of the permissibility of Supremacy Clause rights of action by deferring to 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in its review of California’s rate cuts).
83 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
84 Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End–Run Around the Administrative Pro-
cess?, 122 Yale L. J. Online 1, 6 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/30/sharkey.html (noting 
that the typical federal preemption defense involves a party claiming that a federal law preempts a 
state law of which that party is accused of a violation).
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Supremacy Clause.85 Nevertheless, some federal circuit courts have accepted the 
theory that private litigants may enforce the supremacy of the Medicaid Act 
against noncompliant states.86 This has provided an alternative mechanism for 
private parties to challenge state Medicaid decisions that offend the Medicaid 
Act when HHS does not act.87
These questions have been complicated by the repeal of the Boren 
Amendment. This is because the statutory language on which plaintiffs had 
so successfully relied changed to its modern version, which after Gonzaga
most federal courts have determined is no longer enforceable against states.88
Nonetheless, Supremacy Clause actions have the potential to reanimate 30(A) 
litigation, because preemption does not hinge on an individually enforceable 
“right.” The Supreme Court dodged this question in Douglas, but the issue is 
sure to arise again soon.
In addition, even in this relatively stable third phase of litigation, the two 
threats to private rights of action remain. States continue to press for an end 
to private enforcement of the Medicaid Act, and Justices continue to express 
skepticism regarding any private rights of action against states in the Medicaid 
program.89 The next section explores this dynamic through the lens of Indiana’s 
push for certiorari in early 2013.
B. Near Miss—October Term 2012
Lower federal courts have been largely willing to hear most Medicaid 
challenges in the third phase, with the notable and important exception of 30(A) 
actions.90 However, circuit courts’ application of the § 1983 framework has been 
85 But see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
86 This led to the petition for certiorari being granted in Douglas v. Independent Living Center,
argued during the October 2011 term, which is discussed throughout this Article. Douglas v. Indep. 
Living Ctr. of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
87 See, e.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509–11 (8th Cir. 2006).
88 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 447–48 (describing lower courts’ 
treatment of 30(A) after Gonzaga).
89 See, e.g., Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1214 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing doubt that any 
private rights of action exist in the Medicaid program, whether under the Supremacy Clause or 
otherwise). 
90 See Binta B. ex rel SA v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2013) (allowing § 1983 action to 
proceed); John B. v. Emkes, 710 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2013) (not allowing 30(A) action to proceed, but 
allowing a 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43)(C) action to proceed); Consejo de Salud de la Comunidad de la 
Playa de Ponce, Inc. v. Gonzalez–Feliciano, 695 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2012) (also allowing § 1983 actions 
for § 1396a(bb) enforcement); Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2012) (assumes plain-
tiffs can maintain § 1983 action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)); Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir. 2012) (allowing § 1983 enforcement of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) and related regulations); 
Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012) (also allowing § 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid 
Act, §§ 1396p(d)(4) & 1396a(a)(18)); E.M.A. ex rel. Plyler v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(allowing § 1983 actions to enforce Medicaid’s anti–lien provision), affirmed by Wos v. E.M.A., 133 
S. Ct. 1391 (2013); Bontrager v. Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2012) (al-
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uneven. Some courts ignore the Gonzaga modification of Blessing, some courts 
substitute Gonzaga for Blessing, but most courts see Gonzaga as modifying the 
first part of the Blessing test.91 The jurisprudence is stable enough for states to 
be nervous about private actions, especially with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
pending. But, there is enough disagreement between circuits to permit states 
to push for certiorari, as they did this past term, and to test the two consistent 
objections to private actions in Medicaid: state sovereignty concerns and 
spending power exceptionalism.
During the spring of the October 2012 term, Indiana filed two petitions for 
certiorari, and the sense is that the Court’s denial of the petitions was a close 
shave.92 The two cases had § 1983 at their heart, but the Seventh Circuit had no 
trouble finding private rights of action in each instance. The first case involved 
Indiana’s $1000 cap on coverage of dental care for Medicaid patients, which 
was challenged as a violation of Medicaid’s comparability provision due to its 
arbitrary limitations on access to certain dental procedures.93 Both the district 
court and the Seventh Circuit held that enrollees could seek an injunction against 
Indiana under § 1983 to end this limit on Medicaid coverage.94 The second 
case involved Indiana’s attempt to completely defund Planned Parenthood by 
preventing government funding, state or federal, from flowing to any entity that 
provides abortion services, even if privately funded.95 Again the district court 
and the Seventh Circuit held that the parties had access to injunctive relief 
through § 1983.96 Nevertheless, Indiana pushed the § 1983 question to the fore 
lowing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) actions to proceed under § 1983); Planned Parenthood of Indiana, 
Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012) (allowing § 1396a(a)
(23) enforcement to proceed under § 1983); Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc. v. Olson, 
676 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2012) (allowing anti–lien actions under § 1983); Concillo de Salud Integral 
de Loiza, Inc. v. Perez–Perdomo, 551 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2008) (allowing a § 1983 action to enforce 42 
U.S.C. §1396a(bb)); James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (allowing § 1983 enforcement of 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r–5); Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 562 F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 2008) (allowing § 
1983 actions to enforce the Medicaid Act). 
91 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 442–43 (detailing the varying circuit 
approaches to applying Gonzaga as of 2008).
92 The Supreme Court online news source SCOTUSblog described both petitions as “peti-
tions to watch” because they were likely to be granted. See Mary Pat Dwyer, Petition of the day, SCO-
TUSblog (Apr. 16, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/petition–of–the–day–437/ 
(regarding Bontrager); Mary Pat Dwyer, Petition of the day, SCOTUSblog (May 21, 2013, 9:11 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/05/petition–of–the–day–457/ (regarding Planned Parenthood of 
Indiana); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Indiana’s Second Petition for Certiorari Denied, HealthLaw-
Prof Blog (May 29, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/2013/05/indi-
anas–second–petition–for–certiorari–denied.html.
93 Bontrager, 697 F.3d 604.
94 Id.; Bontrager v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 829 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
95 Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. Dept. of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 
892, 897–98 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
96 Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. Dept. of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 
972–77 (7th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood of Indiana, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 901–03.
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in its petitions for certiorari.97 Indiana presented the petitions as companion 
cases and asked the Court to grant the petitions in tandem.98 In both petitions, 
Indiana asked the Court to overrule Wilder,99 and in both petitions, the state 
(supported by about ten other states) decried enforcement of Medicaid’s rules 
by private rights of action.100
The Court’s denial of certiorari can be interpreted several ways, each of 
which is worth noting given the pressures of the oncoming Medicaid expansion 
and their potential to test conditional spending. First, the federalism questions 
offered to the Court in Indiana v. Planned Parenthood were ensconced in an 
abortion funding predicate. Many anti–abortion politicians are creating 
legislation in the states that is designed to test the Court’s interest in upholding 
such precedents as Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.101 Additionally, 
states have attempted to completely block the flow of governmental funding to 
healthcare providers that provide abortion services alongside other reproductive 
healthcare.102 Indiana offered itself as the test–case for such funding limitations, 
and the Court did not bite, leaving in place the Seventh Circuit’s holding that 
Indiana cannot limit funding for Medicaid providers in this way without 
running afoul of Medicaid’s free choice of provider provision.103
A second potential explanation is that the Court had granted a separate 
Seventh Circuit § 1983 case for the October 2013 term and could have used 
97 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Bontrager, 133 
S. Ct. 2002 (2013) (No. 12–1037), 2013 WL 660664 (“The question presented is: Does 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) create federal ‘rights’ that may be privately enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by 
Medicaid beneficiaries?”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Sec’y of the Ind. Family and Soc. 
Servs. Admin. v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2736 (2013) (No. 12–1039), 2013 WL 
660665. The first question presented was: “Does 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) create federal “rights” in 
Medicaid beneficiaries that may be privately enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Medicaid benefi-
ciaries and providers?” 
98 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Sec’y of the Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 133 S. Ct. 
2736 (No. 12–1039) (“The Court should take this case (as well as Bontrager . . . ) . . . .”). 
99 Id. at 10; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Ind. Family and Soc. Serv. Admin., 133 S. Ct. 
2002 (No. 12–1037).
100 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–28, Sec’y of the Ind. Family and Soc. Serv. Admin., 133 S. 
Ct. 2736 (No. 12–1039); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12–32, Ind. Family and Soc. Serv. Admin., 133 
S. Ct. 2002 (No. 12–1037). Indiana painted a somewhat misleading picture of the confusion Gonzaga
has created in lower federal courts in its petition, asserting that most lower federal courts were ready 
to eliminate § 1983 actions for Medicaid enrollees and providers when in fact it is primarily 30(A) 
actions that have been halted. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–24, Ind. Family and Soc. Serv. 
Admin., 133 S. Ct. 2002 (No. 12–1037); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13–20, Sec’y of the Ind. Family 
and Soc. Serv. Admin., 133 S. Ct. 2736 (No. 12–1039). Other provisions of the Medicaid Act remain 
enforceable through § 1983 actions. 
101 See State Policy Trends 2013: Abortion Bans Move to the Fore, Guttmacher Institute
(April 11, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/04/11/index.html.
102 See Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2012 State Policy Review, Guttmacher 
Institute (last visited Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2012/statet-
rends42012.html.
103 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2012).
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that petition’s question to revisit § 1983.104 The petition was grounded in the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act rather than Medicaid; notably, the 
ADEA has a remedial scheme whereas Medicaid does not. Under existing 
ADEA precedent, the § 1983 right of action did not seem to be strong. The 
case was dismissed as improvidently granted based on a procedural technicality, 
but the Court could hear Madigan v. Levin or a similar case again, depending 
on lower federal courts’ disposition of the case on rehearing.105
This leads to a related third possibility, which is that the Court could have 
decided a low–profile case this past term based on § 1983 but did not do so. 
In March, the Court held in Wos v. E.M.A. that states must make an effort to 
calculate actual medical expenses when claiming part of a Medicaid enrollee’s 
tort recovery because of the Anti–Lien provisions of the Medicaid Act.106 The 
state claimed more money from the settlement than the plaintiff believed to be 
appropriately allocated to medical expenses, so E.M.A. sought to recover from 
the state; the Court held that the state law describing the irrebuttable one–third 
presumption of tort recovery was preempted by the Medicaid Act.107
For purposes of this paper, Wos has two interesting aspects. First, E.M.A. 
and her parents filed the lawsuit under § 1983 to enjoin the state from violating 
the Medicaid Act. The majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy noted 
this procedure, but then wrote nothing more about § 1983.108 Second, the 
opinion explicitly described the state law as preempted by the Medicaid Act.109
Both § 1983 and Medicaid Act preemption of state laws have been hot button 
issues, and so it may be tempting to perceive Wos as putting those issues to 
rest.110 Neither the majority nor the dissent in Wos engaged the federalism–
104 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 1600 (U.S. 2013).
105 Madigan v. Levin, 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam, dismissed as improvidently granted 
without comment).
106 North Carolina had instituted a one–third rule that made it so that no matter the size of 
the recovery or the nature of the allocation, North Carolina would claim one–third of a plaintiff ’s 
tort recovery, calling it the state’s portion of the medical care expenses paid for by Medicaid. Wos 
v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1402 (2013) (holding that the Anti–Lien provisions of 
the Medicaid Act prevented a state from claiming any portion of a tort recovery other than those 
designated as medical expense payments). 
107 The Anti–Lien provision prevents states from placing a lien on tort recoveries for people 
who are enrolled in Medicaid because of an injury that leaves them permanently disabled. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(a)(1) (2012). In Wos, the enrollee was a child who was severely injured during the labor and 
delivery process and who suffered permanent mental and physical damage. Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1395.
108 Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1395–96. In the language of 1983, the parents were seeking to have the 
court enjoin the state from violating E.M.A.’s statutory rights under the Medicaid Act.
109 Id. at 1398.
110 See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, Victory for Enforcement of Medicaid in Wos v. E.M.A., The Con-
stitutional Accountability Center (Mar. 22, 2013), http://theusconstitution.org/text–his-
tory/1895/victory–enforcement–medicaid–wos–v–ema (writing that the majority’s acceptance of 
both the § 1983 and the preemption aspects of the plaintiffs’ claims was a significant victory for 
private Medicaid enforcement); Simon Lazarus, ‘Supreme Law’—for Medicaid Patients or Just Busi-
ness?, The National Law Journal (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.
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based, states’ rights–aggrandizing arguments made by North Carolina and its 
supporting, Texas–led amici.111
But, the Court will likely hear this set of issues again. A core group of 
states is supporting each effort to terminate private rights of action to enforce 
the terms of the Medicaid Act. In each of the three above–mentioned cases, 
eleven states filed a joint amicus brief describing the reasons that the Court 
should reject private rights of action in Medicaid.112 These states are pushing 
the Court to consider the status of § 1983 actions against states when they do 
not adhere to the Medicaid Act. And, the Court did not answer the question 
of Supremacy Clause rights of action for private parties last term, leaving that 
question open as well.113 In addition, the conservatively oriented Justices on the 
Court may still convince Justice Kennedy that federalism does demand that 
either Congress write a private cause of action into the statute or no private 
actions can lie. A consistent line of dissents has articulated concerns for the 
states in the Medicaid program, most recently the strongly worded dissent 
authored by the Chief Justice in Douglas v. Independent Living Center.114 But, 
Justice Kennedy did not join that dissent, and he authored the majority in Wos.
Finally, the opinion in Wos reads as a warning to states that says “we meant what 
we said in Ahlborn,” which was positively cited, referenced, and otherwise relied 
on in Wos.115 Thus, it seems overly optimistic to read Wos as putting the § 1983 
or the preemption question to rest.
States are aggressively asserting their sovereignty in Medicaid cases, 
seemingly in the hopes that they will present a desirable petition for 
certiorari to the Court. Though Indiana’s petitions this term were denied, 
jsp?id=1202597613795.
111 Brief of Texas, Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Ohio and South Carolina as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Delia v. E.M.A., 133 S. 
Ct. 1391, No. 12–98 (4th Cir. Nov. 16, 2012), 2012 WL 5872818 (the case later became Wos v. E.M.A.).
112 The overlap between the cases is substantial but not precise. See id.; cf. Brief of Amici 
Curiae States of Michigan, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, Texas 
and Utah in Support of Petitioners, Sec’y of the Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Planned 
Parenthood of Indiana, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2736 (2013) (No. 12–1039), 2013 WL 1247967; cf. Brief of Amici 
Curiae States of Michigan, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Texas, and Utah in Support Of Petitioners, Ind. Family and Soc. Serv. Admin. v. Bontrager, 133 S. 
Ct. 2002 (2013) (No. 12–1037), 2013 WL 1247966.
113 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2012) 
(deferring to HHS to exercise primary jurisdiction over the question of whether providers pay-
ments could be cut by 10% across the board and still meet the terms of 30(a) without answering 
the petition’s question regarding the permissibility of Supremacy Clause rights of action to enjoin 
Medicaid Act violations).
114 Id. (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (explaining why no private party should be able to raise a 
preemption claim for injunctive relief in the Medicaid program). The dissent showed little regard 
for Medicaid’s particulars and instead dove into constitutional questions. Id.
115 See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1395 (2013) (citing Arkansas Dept. 
of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006)) (starting the majority opinion with a 
cite to Ahlborn’s preemption analysis).
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the states undoubtedly will continue to test the fence, especially in light of 
their federalism win in NFIB v. Sebelius.116 The next section considers these 
sovereignty arguments.
C. State Sovereignty in Medicaid
When states agree to participate in the Medicaid program, they know 
that failure to comply with the terms of the Medicaid Act will result in either 
the Secretary taking action to bring the state into alignment with the Act or 
private enforcement of the law. Contrary to the claims they have made since 
Pennhurst,117 the private enforcement of the Medicaid Act is not a surprise to 
the states, and it has not been for decades (since at least 1980 when Thiboutot 
was decided). Yet, the states claim repeatedly that they do not have clear notice 
of the right to private enforcement of the Medicaid Act in the language of the 
statute.
The federalism argument that states have been making in § 1983 cases, that 
state sovereignty is offended by private remedies for violations of the Medicaid 
Act, is disconnected from the fact that the states have agreed to comply with 
the federal law and its conditions. The compliance requirement does not differ 
whether a federal agency or a federal court commands the conformity. And, a 
private right of action does not threaten state sovereignty when the state has 
already agreed to abide by federal law and implement its policies in exchange 
for substantial funding. Nevertheless, states seek to continue the Federalism 
Revolution, which was started by the Rehnquist Court’s active enforcement 
of the Tenth Amendment against the federal government in exercises of the 
commerce power, and which the Roberts Court continued in NFIB v. Sebelius
by applying the Tenth Amendment to exercises of the spending power.118 For 
the states urging the Court to overturn Wilder, it appears the next step in the 
Federalism Revolution is to move beyond coercion to further limit the influence 
of federal policy by preventing judicial enforcement of federal laws against the 
states.
In pressing the anti– § 1983 arguments, states are speaking to the more 
conservative members of the Court. They are writing to Justice Alito, who 
authored Arlington v. Murphy, a spending power decision that reinforced the 
“clear notice” requirement for conditions on federal spending in the name of 
protecting states entering cooperative federalism programs.119 They are writing 
to Chief Justice Roberts, who authored the NFIB plurality opinion finding 
116 See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into End-
less Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
93 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 47–50 (2013) [hereinafter Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties].
117 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
118 See Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 116, at 47–50.
119 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–96 (2006).
Kentucky Law Journal344 [ Vol. 102
unconstitutional coercion in the enactment of the Medicaid expansion.120
They are writing to Justice Kennedy, champion of federalism who authored a 
majority opinion in Bond v. United States that extolled the virtues of federalism,
121 and that has been oft–cited both in the Court’s opinions and in state briefs. 
(Notably, Bond was before the Court again in the October 2013 term.122) Justice 
Kennedy also authored a concurrence in United States v. Comstock describing 
the need to limit the spending power to honor the doctrine of federalism.123
They are speaking to Justice Scalia, who authored Printz v. United States, the 
Rehnquist Court’s decision decrying “dragooning” of state executive actors.124
And, they are writing to Justice Thomas, who would not recognize broad 
congressional authority at all.125
Even though federal agencies have the power to enforce the Medicaid 
Act, and would probably be the best enforcers with the right funding and 
staffing, states know that HHS is a struggling supervisor that is grossly 
under–staffed and under–funded.126 Former administrators of HHS described 
in a high–profile amicus brief how difficult fifty–state enforcement is.127 The 
former administrators also described how heavily the central agency relies on 
private actions to alert HHS to states running afoul of the Medicaid Act.128
Private actions raise red and yellow flags for HHS, in addition to improving 
the Medicaid program for the parties involved in the litigation. Regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the ACA will increase the flow of information 
to HHS regarding state compliance with 30(A), but HHS does not have 
120 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012).
121 Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
122 Bond v. United States, No. 12–158 (3d Cir. May 3, 2012).
123 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965–68 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
124 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997).
125 Justice Thomas’s dissents and concurrences in the line of cases narrowing the commerce 
power protest every time that he would not recognize Congress’s ability to regulate activities that 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (detailing the opinions in which Thomas has so protested; interestingly, the other Justices 
never join his “original understanding” argument).
126 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It 
Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 2323, 2380–82 (2010) (arguing that agency enforce-
ment is more efficient, exercises appropriate expertise, and is a generally better option than the 
piecemeal enforcement of federal courts, but only if federal agencies are properly equipped).
127 Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Douglas 
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (Nos. 09–958, 09–1158, & 
10–283), 2011 WL 3706105 at 18.
128 Id. at 2. The brief opens:
[I]t has consistently been HHS’s position that private enforcement of § 30(A) is 
not just appropriate, but also necessary to ensure that states comply with this critical 
regulatory mandate. Nor is there anything to the Justice Department’s suggestion that 
private enforcement would interfere with the Secretary’s discretion. As a matter of 
both historical practice and current law, private enforcement only complements the 
Secretary’s authority.
Id.
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increased funding, staffing, or power necessary to respond effectively to state 
self–reporting.129
This discussion has conflated § 1983 rights of action and Supremacy 
Clause actions by Medicaid providers and enrollees because both offer access to 
federal courts. The discussion also has conflated these separate actions because 
they have worked side–by–side in the Medicaid context to persuade states to 
comply with the federal statute. But, importantly, these actions are not the 
same. Section 1983 actions involve the use of one federal statute to enforce 
the rights protected by another federal statute. Section 1983 exists because the 
Fourteenth Amendment was read not to protect former slaves from private 
acts that furthered segregation and violence against African Americans, even 
though those private acts were protected by the states through state inaction.130
Thus, § 1983 is a statutory action that enforces individual rights when the 
Constitution does not clearly protect those rights.
On the other hand, Supremacy Clause actions enforce a constitutional 
principle, that states must abide by the supreme law of the land, whether it be 
Constitution, treaty, or federal law.131 When Medicaid providers and enrollees 
seek federal court protection in a Supremacy Clause action, they are asking 
federal courts to enjoin states from violating the Supremacy Clause because 
they are ignoring a federal law that they have already agreed to obey. The 
constitutional aspect of these actions appears to have been irrelevant to the 
Douglas dissent, which did not distinguish between the Supremacy Clause 
cause of action and implied rights of action.132 Instead, the dissent argued that 
the Supremacy Clause action would create an “end–run” around the body of 
law that increasingly limits implied rights of action.133 This is not correct. The 
Supremacy Clause does not offer an “end–run,” it provides clear constitutional 
notice to the states that they are expected to abide by federal law or their 
129 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
130 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883) (finding that private acts cannot be im-
puted to the states and therefore are not covered by the language of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238–42 (1972) (tracing the history of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 (§ 1983)). 
131 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2–3. The Supremacy Clause states: 
This Constitution , and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof … shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby … the Members of the several State Legislatures . . . shall be bound by 
Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution . . . .
Id.
132 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 Yale L.J. Online
13, 17 (2012), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the–yale–law–journal–pocket–part/supreme–court/
douglas–and–the–fate–of–ex–parte–young/ (writing that the Roberts dissent failed to explain ad-
equately the analogy between § 1983 and Supremacy Clause actions when the two implicate dif-
ferent issues).
133 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2012) (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting).
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offending actions will fail.134 Otherwise, states are able to effectively nullify the 
Medicaid Act, and nullification laws have long been understood to be invalid.135
The Douglas dissent provided important insight for federal courts’ role in 
Medicaid enforcement. If Justices on the Supreme Court are not willing to 
distinguish between statutory and constitutional rights of action, then lower 
federal courts are not likely to do so either. Rather than being bothered 
that states are talking out both sides of their mouths, the Court has actually 
encouraged states to use federal courts as a shield against federal legislation as 
well as a sword against private actions. States are thus doubly protected, while 
Medicaid participants face the possibility of no protection.
II. The Lost Opportunity of the ACA
Depending on the number of states that participate in the Medicaid 
expansion, approximately sixteen million new enrollees will be added to the 
sixty million already enrolled in the Medicaid program.136 This means that about 
one–quarter of the United States population will be covered by Medicaid. This 
significant growth in the Medicaid program will undoubtedly strain the already 
tense relationship between the federal government and the states, and it will 
exacerbate a number of existing problems in the program’s current structure. 
134 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1026 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that 
without the Supremacy Clause, “the Union as we know it could not exist.”).
135 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958). The Court wrote of the state’s effort to “nul-
lify” federally–ordered desegregation: 
In short, the constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school 
admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in the Brown case can 
neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial 
officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation 
whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’
Id. (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940)). The Court continued:
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution 
without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a 
unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, 
annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired 
under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery * * *.’ A 
Governor who asserts a power to nullify a federal court order is similarly restrained. 
If he had such power, said Chief Justice Hughes, in 1932, also for a unanimous Court, 
‘it is manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United 
States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal 
Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases * * *.’ 
Id. at 18–19 (citing United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136 (1809); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 
378, 397–398 (1932)).
136 See generally Carter C. Price & Christine Eibner, For States that Opt Out of Medicaid Ex-
pansion: 3.6 Million Fewer Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, 32 Health Aff. 1030 
( June 2013), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/6/1030.full.pdf+html (describ-
ing and quantifying the financial and coverage implications of the states opting out of Medicaid). 
The financial ramifications are outside the scope of this Article, but Price and Eibner described in 
hard, quantifiable terms that states opting out of Medicaid not only lose out on major funding but 
also jeopardize their poor populations who will not be covered anywhere. See id. at 1033–35.
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The ACA could have addressed the statutory silence that the Medicaid Act 
suffers with regard to private enforcement of the states’ behavior in the program. 
In fact, the ACA did address an interpretive problem brewing in lower federal 
courts regarding whether Medicaid promises care and payment or just payment 
(the former is correct).137 But, Congress failed to address in the ACA one of the 
greatest sources of Medicaid turmoil: whether private parties can force states to 
comply with the Medicaid Act.
Part I explored the lack of administrative remedies available to private 
parties harmed by state noncompliance, and the contours of providers’ and 
enrollees’ reliance on either § 1983 or Supremacy Clause actions to rein in 
rogue states (or, more likely, to get states to pay “sufficiently” for providers to 
participate in the program). This Part will address how this major omission will 
be exacerbated by implementation of the ACA through the additional pressure 
that the legion of new enrollees will place on an overburdened program and the 
increased tensions that will result in Medicaid’s extant, multi–layered power 
struggle.
A. Enrollment Pressure
Because the Medicaid expansion was rendered optional by the plurality in 
NFIB,138 guessing how many will be added to the Medicaid rolls has become 
a full–time job while state governors and legislatures play a game of political 
chicken deciding whether they will opt in or opt out of the expansion.139 Current 
estimates140 indicate that Medicaid will become the predominant method of 
healthcare payment in the country.141 The increased enrollment is due not only 
to the Medicaid expansion, but also to the “welcome mat” or “woodwork” effect 
137 For further description of this Circuit Court misinterpretation of the Medicaid Act’s in-
tent, see Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 453–58 (explaining the Seventh Circuit’s 
misinterpretation of the key “medical assistance” language of the Medicaid Act).
138 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012).
139 Data on state choices varies slightly depending on the news media source, but the re-
porting is essentially consistent. See, e.g., Juliette Mullin, A Year Later, 13 Governors Still Oppose 
Medicaid Expansion, The Advisory Board Company ( June 28, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/
Daily–Briefing/Blog/2013/06/13–governors–still–oppose–Medicaid–expansion; The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Found., Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 
as of September 30, 2013, http://kff.org/medicaid/state–indicator/state–activity–around–expand-
ing–medicaid–under–the–affordable–care–act (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
140 See Price & Eibner, supra note 136, at 1034.
141 Dominant in terms of number of lives covered, though not necessarily in terms of political 
or medical power. See Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured,The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Found., Medicaid: A Primer (March 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.
files.wordpress.com/2010/06/7334–05.pdf. The Primer states: “Medicaid now covers over 62 million 
Americans, more than Medicare or any single private insurer. Medicaid covers more than 1 in 3 chil-
dren and over 40% of births. . . . More than 60% of people living in nursing homes are covered by 
Medicaid.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
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of the ACA’s goal of universal coverage.142 This enormous influx of covered 
lives will place pressure on a number of weak spots in HHS oversight of the 
Medicaid program. 
First, the number of enrollees will increase much more than the number 
of physicians participating in the Medicaid program. Even though the Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2013 (HCERA), companion 
legislation to the ACA, increased primary care physician payments to Medicare 
levels for 2013 and 2014,143 the increases may not last long enough144 for 
physicians to want to participate in Medicaid to experience this increase in 
enrollees at the prior, lower payment rates.145 Thus, a higher enrollee to provider 
ratio is likely to exist because the number of physicians serving Medicaid 
patients is unlikely to increase proportionately to the number of new enrollees 
in Medicaid, making access to care more difficult.146 Medicaid participating 
physicians will indubitably experience greater dissatisfaction with the low rates 
states pay. When providers are dissatisfied with the state payment levels and 
methodologies, they typically will first appeal to the state’s Medicaid agency. 
If that is unsuccessful, then providers will team up with patients to enjoin the 
state’s low payment rates in federal court. As was described above, this may 
occur either under § 1983 or the Supremacy Clause, as 30(A) can no longer be 
enforced by providers and sometimes enrollees through § 1983 actions.147 But, 
providers will already be stretched thin and may be more likely to drop out of 
Medicaid rather than bother with challenging the state.
Second, the influx of covered lives will exacerbate the admitted oversight 
142 See generally Julie Sonier, Michel H. Boudreaux & Lynn A. Blewert, Medicaid “Welcome 
Mat” Effect of Affordable Care Act Implementation Could Be Substantial, 32 Health Aff. 1319 ( July 
2013), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/7/1319.abstract (describing why the 
ACA will increase Medicaid enrollment by encouraging people already eligible for Medicaid to 
enroll in addition to the newly eligible population).
143 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010).
144 See, e.g., Benjamin Sommers, Emily Arntson, Genevieve Kenney, & Arnold Epstein, Les-
sons from Early Medicaid Expansions Under the Affordable Care Act, Health Aff. Blog ( June 14, 
2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/06/14/lessons–from–early–medicaid–expansions–under–
the–affordable–care–act (noting that states experimenting with early adoption of the Medicaid ex-
pansion experienced access barriers, particularly in rural areas, and that the “state Medicaid officials 
we interviewed were fairly skeptical that the temporary pay increase would significantly increase 
provider participation in Medicaid.”).
145 See Phil Galewitz, Few Medicaid Docs Have Seen 2013 Pay Raise, Kaiser Health News
( July 16, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013–07–16/national/40598337_1_pay–raise–
obama–administration–california–medicaid (noting that the pay raise was implemented late and 
will not last long enough to draw new physicians to serve Medicaid patients).
146 See Sandra L. Decker, Two–Thirds of Primary Care Physicians Accepted New Medicaid Pa-
tients in 2011–12: A Baseline to Measure Future Acceptance Rates, 32 Health Aff. 1183, 1186 ( July 2013), 
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/32/7/1183.short (cautioning that increased pay-
ments may not be enough to encourage physicians to accept Medicaid as reimbursement for their 
services and that the limited increase in payments will self–mitigate).
147 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 447.
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limitations of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). This is 
due to a number of factors, only one of which is the number of new enrollees 
that will be covered by Medicaid. More important is that the new enrollees are 
likely to “churn” in and out of Medicaid, and in large numbers.148 In this case, it 
means those newly eligible enrollees will churn between public insurance and 
private insurance, jumping from Medicaid to federally–subsidized private health 
insurance.149 Unless a state has a waiver to create a system like that approved for 
Arkansas, which will place the newly eligible population in private insurance by 
way of premium assistance, the newly enrolled will be a population in perpetual 
flux.150 CMS will likely strain, given its acknowledged limited supervisory 
capacity, to track this churning new enrollee population and its needs.151 Some 
predict that millions of people will churn in and out of Medicaid each year, 
which can lead to lower quality of care and inconsistent care, more visits to 
emergency departments, and delay in necessary medical care.152
These challenges for CMS are likely to be complicated by the predicted 
primary care provider shortage described above. Providers often protect 
enrollee interests by protecting their own interest in adequate payment, which 
helps to ensure adequate access to non–emergency medical care. But, existing 
Medicaid providers are seeing more enrollees, and the higher provider–enrollee 
ratio will make it more difficult for providers to seek federal interference when 
a state proposes changes to its program that could harm enrollees or does not 
deliver on Medicaid promises. Also, being stretched thin may influence more 
providers to cease participation in Medicaid, thereby diminishing CMS’s de 
facto administrators. In addition, advocate resource strain will make it so that 
private, non–profit entities that act as watchdogs for Medicaid will have a 
harder time raising the yellow and red flags that CMS also admits to relying on 
for programmatic oversight. 
148 Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health Insur-
ance —The Great New Experiment?, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 7, 8 (2013) (“Our research suggests that 
low–income adults experience so much income fluctuation that 28 million annually could “churn” 
across the Medicaid–exchange divide . . . .”).
149 See Matthew Wayt, ‘Churning’: The Latest Watchword for States Working on Health Re-
form, California Healthline ( July 31, 2013), http://www.californiahealthline.org/road–to–re-
form/2013/churning–the–latest–watchword–for–states–working–on–health–reform (describing 
how “life events” like marriage, the birth of children, divorce, job changes, and the like can cause in-
come to fluctuate and impact health insurance coverage above or below the 138% line for Medicaid 
coverage, and that California has no current means to work through the phenomenon of “churn”).
150 Rosenbaum and Sommers see this as a potential benefit of the Arkansas–style waiver 
(easier tracking of the Medicaid enrollee population). See Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 148,
at 8–9.
151 Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 
127, at 4, 12–26.
152 Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform: How Changes In Eli-
gibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 Health 
Aff. 228, 232–35 (2011) (predicting the magnitude and quality of the churning in and out of Medic-
aid that is likely to occur in the next several years).
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Third, NFIB placed previously unimagined limits on HHS authority. The 
Roberts plurality determined that Congress unconstitutionally coerced states 
into participating in the Medicaid expansion when it mandated expansion and 
left in place the Medicaid Act’s statement of the Secretary’s power to withhold 
or withdraw all or part of a state’s funding when the state does not comply 
with the Medicaid Act.153 The remedy for that coercion was not, however, to 
strike the Medicaid expansion from the ACA; instead, the remedy was to 
limit the Secretary’s ability to penalize noncompliant states by only allowing 
withholding of the funds offered in the ACA. In other words, the Secretary 
could not withhold or withdraw all of a state’s funds for noncompliance with 
the expansion, she could only withhold the extra funding that would come 
with expansion. This severing of the Secretary’s power was unprecedented. And 
so, even though the Court was at pains to limit the reach of its holding to the 
perhaps unique circumstances of the ACA, that does not mean that the Court 
will not tie the Secretary’s hands again.
Each of these factors underlines the missed opportunity of the ACA to 
create a clear remedy for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries when states fail 
in their Medicaid programs. The enrollment growth described above will also 
exacerbate the existing power struggle within Medicaid. Adding millions to 
the Medicaid rolls is indubitably beneficial for the lives being covered, but the 
enrollment pressure will lead to greater tensions between providers and states, 
as well as states and the federal government. 
B. Power Struggle Escalation
The Boren Amendment experiment demonstrated that Medicaid litigation 
can work to change state choices in Medicaid implementation. It also 
demonstrated that Medicaid litigation can backfire, as the states successfully 
convinced Congress to eliminate this source of conflict and litigable payment 
rights. And, it should be acknowledged that litigation has pros and cons. One 
major downside to litigating each provision of the Medicaid Act separately 
is that programmatic uniformity is not usually the goal for either litigants or 
courts, so each circuit may have a different manner of describing Medicaid’s 
requirements. This is inconsistent with the Medicaid Act itself, which created 
a national baseline for the poor to access medical care. On the other hand, 
federal courts’ fear of full dockets is not a downside to this litigation, merely 
a statement of juridical concern. The reason it is not a downside is that, as the 
Boren experiment showed, federal courts can vindicate Medicaid entitlements 
in meaningful ways, and they are much closer to the individuals suffering state 
shortcuts than HHS, due to the nature of litigation itself. In other words, the 
people being harmed know that they can seek redress in federal court, but they 
do not have a sense that complaining to HHS is an effective process. Here is 
153 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012).
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where the Medicaid power struggle really matters.
The federal executive branch prioritizes cooperation with states, so HHS 
has created a largely non–adversarial environment in which states negotiate 
their Medicaid failures with little chance of actually losing Medicaid funds.154
The reason is straightforward: adversarial processes could harm the very 
people Medicaid was intended to benefit. If CMS were to cease funding a 
state’s Medicaid program due to noncompliance, the enrollees in the state 
would lose access to care, and bear the brunt of the penalty rather than the 
offending state’s politicians responsible for the noncompliance.155 In fact, HHS 
has never withheld all of a state’s Medicaid funding. Also, HHS typically does 
not command a state to pay retroactively when the state does run afoul of the 
Medicaid Act by, for example, paying healthcare providers too little under the 
Equal Access provision. So, the federal executive branch appears to protect the 
Medicaid program and its enrollees at the global level rather than on a micro–
level. Federal courts do not feel constrained in the same way. Consequently, part 
of the power struggle is occurring between the federal executive and federal 
judicial branches. 
This clash was demonstrated recently in Douglas v. Independent Living 
Center, a 2012 Supreme Court decision in which California’s provider rate cuts 
were challenged as violating the Equal Access provision of the Medicaid Act 
and thus the Supremacy Clause.156 The Court avoided the Supremacy Clause 
question by remanding to the Ninth Circuit so that HHS could exercise primary 
jurisdiction in the case, but a heated dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts 
would have disallowed the Supremacy Clause cause of action for Medicaid 
providers and beneficiaries.157 The United States Solicitor General’s Office 
supported California’s advocacy in this regard, filing a stunning amicus brief 
that argued no Supremacy Clause actions should be available.158 The Secretary of 
HHS pointedly did not join this amicus, apparently after failing to persuade the 
Acting Solicitor General that such a position would be harmful to the Medicaid 
program.159 The HHS position was represented by a high profile amicus brief 
154 See Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties supra note 116, at 17 (describing the 
negotiating process between HHS and states, which has never resulted in total funding with-
drawal), 75–76 (describing confusion over this fact during oral arguments).
155 Solicitor General Verrilli had a hard time articulating this conundrum during oral argu-
ments defending the Medicaid expansion. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55–56, Florida v. HHS, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11–400). Justice Breyer tried to help the Solicitor General, but Verrilli did 
not pick up on the lifeline. See id.; see also Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra
note 116, at 75.
156 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1205 (2012).
157 Id. at 1206–08, 1212.
158 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24–25, Douglas v. 
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc., (2012) (Nos. 09–958, 09–1158, 10–283), 2011 WL 2132705 at 
*24–25.
159 See Nicole Huberfeld, Post–Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects 
Conflicting Attitudes, 21 Annals Health L. 513, 520–22 (2012) (discussing the conflict between 
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written by former HHS administrators that described how important private 
rights of action are to policing states in Medicaid.160 Members of Congress 
also submitted a brief explaining that Congress has considered eradicating 
private actions for 30(A), and such deliberations led to Congress intentionally 
leaving 30(A) in the Medicaid Act, with no bar on private actions.161 This fight 
emphasizes how far off base the states’ sovereignty arguments are in the context 
of private enforcement of Medicaid and underlines executive branch tensions.
Further, federal court actions can yield synergies with the purposes of 
the Medicaid program. For example, when the courts were taking Boren 
Amendment cases in the 1980’s and 1990’s, their inclination to enforce 
statutory payment provisions resulted in increased state payments to providers, 
which naturally helps to facilitate enrollee access. At the same time, Congress 
was adding mandatory categories of eligibility to the program, thereby also 
expanding access to Medicaid.162 Thus, the judiciary and the legislature were not 
working at cross–purposes, even though they were not purposefully working 
together to facilitate such expansion. Also, the circuits sometimes follow one 
another’s lead in deciding the enforceability of Medicaid provisions, thereby 
creating some national uniformity and adhering to the purposes of creating a 
national medical program for the poor. And, the courts can “prompt” agencies 
to act, especially when litigation highlights problems the agency was otherwise 
unaware of.163
Nevertheless, if the exceptionalist theory of spending statutes becomes the 
majority view on the Court, then the judiciary and the administrative arm of 
the executive branch will be working at cross–purposes, potentially creating 
a separation of powers dilemma. This theory has surfaced in spending power 
decisions for decades, and it recently surfaced again in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
HHS and the Solicitor General’s office) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Post–Reform Medicaid Before the 
Court].
160 See generally Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 127, at 15–16. This intra–branch dispute was watched closely for what it portended in the 
ACA litigation that followed. Interestingly, the most important aspect of the decision for NFIB
purposes was probably that the Roberts dissent paid scant attention to the finer points of the Med-
icaid program, instead showing concern for constitutional principles that were housed in a health-
care vehicle, much like the factually fallacious plurality in NFIB. Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1212 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (focusing on the spending power rather than the intricacies of the Medicaid pro-
gram); see generally Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 116 (deconstructing 
the factual and constitutional problems in the Medicaid aspect of the NFIB decision).
161 Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Support of Respondents at 21–23, Douglas 
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc., (2012) (Nos. 09–958, 09–1158, 10–280), 2011 WL 3467244, 
at *21–23 (discussing Congress’s choice not to terminate private causes of action enforcing the 
Medicaid Act).
162 See Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties, supra note 116, at 20–24 (recounting 
prior Medicaid expansions that were mandatory for states participating in the program).
163 See Sharkey, supra note 84, at 5–6 (describing federal courts’ role as “prompting” agency 
actions when agencies cannot or do not otherwise manage their regulatory domain). 
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Douglas dissent.164 This theory would eradicate private rights of action to 
enforce the conditions placed on states in federal spending programs under the 
belief that spending statutes are a different, lesser form of federal legislation 
that is so much like a contract that only the federal government and the state 
agreeing to accept the funding can negotiate the terms of that program.165
Thus, only the enforcing agency has power over a digressive state, because 
program enrollees are essentially third–party beneficiaries with no power to 
intervene, given that contracts were not enforceable at the time § 1983 was 
enacted.166 This theory hinges on the lack of explicit private action language in 
the Medicaid Act, irrespective of Congress’ longstanding complicity in private 
Medicaid enforcement actions.167 If Congress were to modify the Medicaid Act 
to include such language, which it should have done in the ACA’s sweep, then 
interpretation of that right would be much more straightforward than actions 
through either § 1983 or the Supremacy Clause.168
A complex power struggle exists between the states and the federal 
government as well. The federal government has shown itself to be divided by 
branch, and even intra–branch, in running the Medicaid program.169 Again, to 
use the example of Douglas, the state’s interest was aligned with the enforcement 
arm of the executive branch, which agreed with California’s assertion that no 
Supremacy Clause action was valid. But, the administrative arm of the executive 
branch disagreed, creating an intra–branch dispute.170 California’s interest was 
rejected by members of Congress, some of whom filed an amicus brief in the 
case.171 The federal agency’s views were aligned with the majority in the Court’s 
decision, given that it avoided the constitutional question of private rights of 
action, but the state was aligned with the strongly worded dissent, displaying 
164 Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1214 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
165 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 28 (1981). Then–Justice 
Rehnquist wrote, in language seemingly intended to limit Thiboutot (decided only the year before): 
“In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance 
with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather 
action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.” Id. at 28.
166 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349–50 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning 
whether § 1983 “ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal–state funding and spending agree-
ment” to litigate state compliance and likening the beneficiaries of federal spending to third–party 
beneficiaries of contracts).
167 Amicus Brief of Members of Congress Support of Respondents, supra note 161, at 8–11 
(asserting that Congress expects a private right of action to exist and that Congress has debated and 
rejected amendments to 30(A) that would eradicate private actions but rejected such proposals).
168 See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 21, at 467 (suggesting that Congress mod-
ify the Medicaid Act to incorporate the action that it assumes exists).
169 See Huberfeld, Post–Reform Medicaid Before the Court, supra note 159, at 533–40 (analyzing 
the discordant positions the federal government presented in the two Medicaid cases before the 
Court in the October 2011 term).
170 See notes 158–161 and accompanying text.
171 Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Support of Respondents, supra note 161, 
at 8–11.
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another intra–branch dispute. Multiple vectors would be required to diagram 
this set of tensions, adding to the sense that federalism does not capture the 
nature of the disputes here. 
Importantly, neither Congress nor HHS opposes private rights of action 
as a whole. But, in the Douglas case the agency had not completed its review 
of California’s reimbursement decisions, and so the administrative process was 
incomplete.172 The Medicaid enrollees and providers who sought federal court 
protection were concerned that California would cut reimbursement rates 
while HHS considered its proposed State Plan Amendment. Thus, the federal 
court did not just act as a mediator between disagreeing parties at the federal 
and state levels, it gave voice to both the federal agency and the program’s 
beneficiaries and healthcare providers. 
When CMS approves or rejects a State Plan Amendment, citizens have 
no role in that life–impacting decision (other than to participate in the notice 
and comment process). And, perhaps most importantly, the state can act on 
its proposed reductions or other limitations while CMS reviews the proposed 
Amendment, which can take months if not years.173 In the meantime, providers 
may be under–reimbursed or enrollees may not receive needed services, and 
they have no redress without the ability to petition federal courts. Thus, the 
federal courthouse doors must remain open, but for more than agency–forcing. 
The agency may not always act in the best interests of those who Medicaid 
is intended to benefit.174 To come back to Douglas, after the Court’s decision, 
CMS approved California’s rate reductions despite their lack of data collection 
regarding the medical access impact of across–the–board payment reductions.175
CMS should not have deferred; and, even though CMS has supported private 
rights of action, the agency’s approval of California’s cuts thwarted the private 
action in California. 
Medicaid stakeholders are engaging in an ongoing fight over whose power 
and interests should be predominant. States want more federal money but 
172 Professor Sharkey has suggested that when the agency’s interests align with the states’ 
interests in a cooperative federalism program, federal courts have a special role to play by forcing 
the agency to act. See Sharkey, supra note 84, at 9 (“[C]ourts may need to step up in their role as 
guardians and enforcers of the supremacy of federal law” when interests align).
173 California submitted its proposed State Plan Amendment months after it had already ef-
fectuated cuts in provider reimbursement. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Support 
of Respondents, supra note 161, at 24 n.3.
174 One response might be that that the agency’s action would then be deemed arbitrary and 
capricious, but that outcome is often wishful, as CMS lightly reviews such state actions as rate 
reductions. The regulations drafted to address the payment sufficiency standard in 30(A) do not 
require much more than reporting, which facilitates oversight but does not give CMS more options 
in responding to unreasonable payment decreases. 
175 The HHS approval of California’s reimbursement rate cuts lead to additional litigation in 
the Ninth Circuit. See generally Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(reviewing HHS’s approval of California’s rate cuts and affording the Secretary Chevron deference 
for the decision); see also Brietta Clark, APA Deference After Independent Living Center: Why Infor-
mal Adjudicatory Action Needs a Hard Look, 102 Ky. L.J. 211 (2014).
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fewer federal conditions and less federal oversight. The enforcement arm of 
the executive branch appears to want states and the administrative arm of the 
executive branch to work out their differences amicably. The administrative arm 
of the executive branch wants to enforce the statute through cooperation, but it 
also needs and wants help supervising the states in these endeavors. The federal 
courts probably do not want to continue to supervise the implementation of the 
Medicaid program, but they continue to provide an important counterbalance 
to the other players. And, this independent perspective, and power, will become 
more important as the Medicaid expansion is implemented, especially because 
providers and patients are at the mercy of these competing interests with no 
recourse if the courthouse doors are closed.
Conclusion
Each of the participants in Medicaid—states, healthcare providers, enrollees, 
the federal executive branch—believes it is the heart of the Medicaid program. 
But the Medicaid program is a federal program that assists the states so that 
they can help to deliver healthcare to the poor. Thus, despite state and other 
stakeholder claims to the contrary, Medicaid is not for states, it is for people.176
To protect the people enrolled in the Medicaid program, until Congress 
amends the Medicaid Act to provide statutory enforcement mechanisms to 
providers and patients, federal courts must keep their doors open to private 
rights of action that keep states in line with the Medicaid Act. Such private 
actions are consistent with the language and intent of the Medicaid Act, 
and they have the important effect of alerting HHS to state failures as well 
as providing direct remedies to the people who are harmed the most by state 
inattentiveness to the strictures of the Medicaid Act.
176 Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Support of Respondents, supra note 161, 
at 18 (stating that states are “partners” in Medicaid but they are not the “intended beneficiaries of 
Medicaid”).
